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Justice Blackmun and Individual
Rights*
Diane P. Wood**
Of the many contributions Justice Blackmun has made to
American jurisprudence, surely his record in the area of individual
rights stands out for its importance.  Throughout his career on the
Supreme Court, he has displayed concern for a wide variety of indi-
vidual and civil rights.  He has rendered decisions on matters rang-
ing from the most personal interests in autonomy and freedom from
interference from government in life’s private realms, to the in-
creasingly complex problems posed by discrimination based upon
race, sex, national origin, alienage, illegitimacy, sexual orientation,
and other characteristics. As his views have become well known to
the public, both through the opinions he has authored and those he
has joined, he has become known as one of the leading “liberal”
justices of the Burger and Rehnquist Courts—a fact which I believe
has caused him some amusement, given the initial publicity that
greeted his appointment to the Court.  Nevertheless, if “liberal”
here connotes an abiding concern for the individual, a desire both
to keep government in its place and to ensure that governmental
actions facilitate individual development, and a vision of the equal-
ity of human beings before the law, Justice Blackmun richly de-
serves the label.
One could not in the space of one short article canvass every-
thing Justice Blackmun has done in the field of individual rights.
Here, I have chosen to focus on the non-criminal areas relating to
individual autonomy and the right to be free from discrimination
(derived both from statutes and from the Constitution).  The pic-
ture that emerges is one of a hierarchy of rights, ranging from the
most highly protected against governmental restriction to those that
are more subject to democratic controls.  It is at times a complex
picture, for Justice Blackmun insists on seeing the world in all its
* Originally published in 97 DICK. L. REV. 421 (1993).
** Harold J. and Marion F. Green Professor of International Legal Studies, The
University of Chicago Law School.
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factual disarray, and he resists the temptation to employ the simpli-
fying assumptions of abstract theory that might make his judging
job easier.  He prefers the more difficult approach that is firmly
grounded in the facts of each case, knowing that in the long run this
will produce the most just results, as well as the soundest develop-
ment of the law.
I. THE RIGHT TO BE LET ALONE
It is not just the notoriety of the Supreme Court’s 1973 deci-
sion in Roe v. Wade that causes me to place the “right to be let
alone” at the top of Justice Blackmun’s hierarchy.1 In fact, Justice
Blackmun’s consistent position on the abortion issue over the
twenty years that Roe has been law, as well as his decisions on other
so-called privacy issues, suggests that the most sacred area of indi-
vidual rights to him is the one relating to the individual’s personal
autonomy—the right, as he put it in his dissenting opinion in Bow-
ers v. Hardwick,2 “to be let alone” (citing Justice Brandeis’ famous
dissent in Olmstead v. United States3).  In a sense, this is a pre-con-
stitutional right that does not and cannot depend on formal consti-
tutional recognition (which would imply that it could be removed in
the same manner).  Individuals are free from some intimate forms
of governmental intrusion simply by virtue of their humanity.
The Justice freely acknowledged in Roe v. Wade that “[t]he
Constitution does not explicitly mention any right of privacy.”4
However, he noted also that in a line of decisions going back to the
late nineteenth century, the Court had “recognized that a right of
personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of pri-
vacy, does exist under the Constitution.”5  This does not mean that
the Constitution created the privacy right, in the same way that it
created the House of Representatives or the Sixth Amendment re-
quirement of juries in criminal trials. Instead, the opinion offers two
possible avenues of constitutional recognition, as it states the key
holding of the Court:
This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth
Amendment’s concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon
state action, as we feel it is, or, as the District Court determined,
in the Ninth Amendment’s reservation of rights to the people, is
1. 410 U.S. 113 (1973), decided with Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
2. 478 U.S. 186, 199 (1986).
3. 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
4. 410 U.S. at 152.
5. Id.
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broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or not
to terminate her pregnancy.6
Put another way, Justice Blackmun articulated in Roe, and the
many cases that followed, the important insight that a core set of
individual rights exists that neither the states nor the federal gov-
ernment may trample, no matter how much due process they may
use.7
The explosive public debate that followed Roe conveniently
disregarded several important points about the decision.  First, by
ignoring Roe’s focus on the woman’s right to choose whether or not
to complete her pregnancy, abortion opponents gave little or no
thought to the many positive steps they might take that would help
both pregnant woman and potential life alike:  steps including bet-
ter access to contraception (which obviously avoids the dilemma in
the first place, and helps to ensure that children when born are
cherished), social acceptance of unmarried pregnant women (thus
reducing the stigma of an unwanted pregnancy), and widespread
and inexpensive day care for young children (so that motherhood
would not mean the economic end of a woman’s life).  Second, Roe
was immediately accused of requiring “abortion on demand,” in
plain contradiction to the opinion’s careful attention to the increas-
ing interest the state has in the developing fetus throughout a preg-
nancy, and the complex balancing between the mother’s interests
and those of the fetus that Roe discusses.
In this rhetorical atmosphere, it was predictable that the limits
of the right recognized in Roe would be tested. They were. In 1975,
the Court considered the validity of a Virginia statute that made it a
misdemeanor “by the sale or circulation of any publication, to en-
courage or prompt the procuring of an abortion.”8 Justice Black-
mun, writing for the same seven-person majority that had decided
Roe, held that the Virginia courts had erred in assuming that com-
mercial speech was entitled to no First Amendment protection.
The majority further held that it would violate the appellant’s First
6. 410 U.S. at 153 (emphasis added).
7. Those who have argued against this idea often dismiss hypothetical rules,
such as state-ordered marriage, state-compelled sterilization, state restrictions on
the race or religion of acceptable marriage partners, or adoptive children, that
would arguably violate it as “things that just wouldn’t happen here.” Unfortu-
nately, both history and contemporary precedent around the world indicate that
this assumption about human behavior is too optimistic.
8. Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
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Amendment rights to apply the statute to his advertisement for
abortion services in New York.9
At the other extreme, the Supreme Court in the 1975 decision
of Connecticut v. Menillo overturned a Connecticut ruling that held
a state statute invalid which criminalized an attempted abortion.
The lower court had applied the law to a person who was not a
physician and who had never had any medical training.10 Roe, the
Court pointed out per curiam, had not gone so far; indeed, its ratio-
nale supported the continued enforceability of criminal abortion
statutes against nonphysicians, insofar as it balanced the risks dur-
ing the first trimester of an abortion done by a physician against the
risks of normal childbirth.
It was not long, however, before many state legislatures began
a kind of war of attrition against Roe v. Wade. Typical of the stat-
utes passed was the one considered in Planned Parenthood of Cen-
tral Missouri v. Danforth,11 which required (1) the woman to certify
in writing her consent to the procedure, (2) consent of the spouse,
(3) parental consent for pregnant minors, (4) prohibition of the use
of a certain technique of abortion after the first 12 weeks of preg-
nancy, (5) recordkeeping requirements, and (6) standards of care
for the aborted fetus.  Again writing for the Court, Justice Black-
mun upheld the written consent and recordkeeping requirements,
and struck down the more onerous spousal consent, parental con-
sent, and care and technique requirements.
These kinds of issues regularly returned to the Court, in a line
of cases including Colautti v. Franklin,12 Bellotti v. Baird,13 Thorn-
burgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists,14
Webster v. Reproductive Health Services,15 Hodgson v. Minnesota,16
9. Id. at 825, 829. Bigelow also gave new life to the protection of commercial
speech in general under the First Amendment—a subject beyond the scope of this
article.
10. Connecticut v. Menillo, 423 U.S. 9 (1975).
11. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
12. 439 U.S. 379 (1979) (standard of care for physician when fetus “may be
viable”).
13. Two phases: first, 428 U.S. 132 (1975) (parental consent); second, 443 U.S.
622 (1979) (parental consent with alternative of judicial approval following paren-
tal notification).
14. 476 U.S. 747 (1986) (informing woman about medical assistance and fa-
ther’s responsibility for child support; required information from physician about
detrimental physical and psychological risks; reporting requirements; degree of
care for postviability abortions; required second physician).
15. 109 S.Ct. 3040 (1989) (legislative “findings” on beginning of human life;
required viability tests for 20 week fetus; prohibition on use of public facilities;
prohibition on use of public funds).
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Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health,17 and, finally, the
1991 decision in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey.18
It is enough here to say that, beginning with Webster, the rights se-
cured by Roe and reaffirmed for many years had become increas-
ingly circumscribed. In many ways, the most significant restrictions
were economic in nature.  The Court in 1977 had drastically cut
back on the right to choose for indigent women, when it upheld a
variety of funding and public facility restrictions in Beal v. Doe,19
Maher v. Roe,20 and Poelker v. Doe,21 all over Justice Blackmun’s
dissents.  It reinforced these rulings in Harris v. McRae,22 which up-
held the so-called Hyde Amendment basically prohibiting all fed-
eral funding of abortions.  Between the funding cases, which had
converted Roe into a commitment to allow non-indigent women to
make decisions about their pregnancies, and the restrictions ap-
proved in Webster, the original 1973 concept had become severely
attenuated.
A large part of the reason for this was political. Roe v. Wade
had become an issue of central importance to the Republican Party
in the presidential elections of 1980, 1984, and 1988.  Many believed
that the justices appointed to the Court during those years were
waiting for the first opportunity to overrule Roe once and for all.
Thus, when Justice O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter supported a
more modest version of Roe in their joint opinion in Casey, Justice
Blackmun both appreciated the significance of their commitment to
“individual liberty and the force of stare decisis.”23  Yet, with an-
other presidential election underway, it was plain for all to see that
a change of one more vote could mean the end not only of Roe but
of the entire vision of individual autonomy upon which it rested. In
language uncharacteristically frank for Supreme Court opinions,
Justice Blackmun wrote:
I am 83 years old. I cannot remain on this Court forever, and
when I do step down, the confirmation process for my successor
may well focus on the issue before us today. That, I regret, may
16. 110 S.Ct. 2926 (1990) (48-hour waiting period; two parent consent require-
ment with judicial bypass).
17. 110 S.Ct. 2972 (1990) (parental notice, judicial bypass).
18. 112 S.Ct. 2791 (1992) (informed consent; 24-hour waiting period; parental
consent; reporting and recordkeeping constitutional; spousal consent
unconstitutional).
19. 432 U.S. 438 (1977).
20. 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
21. 432 U.S. 519 (1977).
22. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
23. 112 S.Ct. at 2844.
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be exactly where the choice between the two worlds [that of the
Court majority and that of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Thomas] will be made.24
No one will know how many voters heard these words, or were in-
fluenced by them, in the 1992 election. Nonetheless, it seems clear
that the majority of Americans are committed to a constitutional
structure in which their fundamental privacy rights and personal au-
tonomy are assured. As time goes on, it has become increasingly
clear that these rights require protection in areas beyond the diffi-
cult and controversial one of abortion. Here, too, Justice Blackmun
has made his mark.
In an area closely related to that of abortion, the Court consid-
ered the constitutionality of a New York statute making it a crime
to sell or distribute any contraceptives to minors under the age of
sixteen, and for anyone other than a licensed pharmacist to dis-
tribute contraceptives to persons sixteen and older, in Carey v. Pop-
ulation Services International.25 Justice Blackmun joined Justice
Brennan’s opinion for the Court holding that regulations imposing
a burden on a decision as fundamental as whether to bear or beget
a child could be justified only by compelling state interests, and had
to be narrowly drawn to express only those interests.  With typical
realism, Justice Blackmun was also part of the four-Justice plurality
which found that the prohibition on distribution to minors under
sixteen could not be justified as a regulation furthering the state’s
policy against “promiscuous sexual intercourse among the young,”
at least in the absence of any evidence that banning contraceptives
might have the desired effect.
More recently, the Justice wrote eloquently of the right to be
let alone in Bowers v. Hardwick,26 in which the validity of the Geor-
gia sodomy statute was at issue. A majority of five upheld the law,
commenting that the Constitution nowhere mentions a “right to en-
gage in homosexual sodomy.”  In dissent, Justice Blackmun
recharacterized the issue: could the law regulate the private, inti-
mate sexual practices of both homosexual and heterosexual con-
senting adults alike (as it purported to do on its face), or does such
a law violate the personal privacy rights of the individuals con-
cerned?  As Justice Blackmun correctly understood, Bowers should
have been an easy case.  Almost any case can be trivialized in the
same way the majority handled Bowers: does the Constitution pro-
24. 112 S.Ct. at 2854-55.
25. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
26. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
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tect the right to purchase 3.2% beer?27  does it protect the right to
attend the University of California at Davis Medical School?28
does it include the right to know the price of prescription drugs?29
The fact that no such clauses appear in the Constitution did not
prevent the Court in those cases from recognizing various types of
constitutional protections that resulted in the specific consequences
noted.  In the same way, Justice Blackmun understood that more
was at stake in Bowers than the particular private conduct in ques-
tion, and that by protecting the intimate conduct of some, we pro-
tect the individual autonomy of all.
Justice Blackmun demonstrated his concern for personal rights
in a family setting in Moore v. City of East Cleveland,30 which in-
volved an astonishing city ordinance that made it a crime for a
homeowner to have living with her a son, a grandson, and a second
grandson who was the cousin rather than the brother of the first.
He joined the plurality opinion written by Justice Powell, which re-
iterated the principles underlying this area:
This Court has long recognized that freedom of personal choice
in matters of marriage and family life is one of the liberties pro-
tected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. . . . A host of cases . . . have consistently acknowledged a
“private realm of family life which the state cannot enter.”31
Whether it is the abortion issue of the 1970’s and 1980’s, the issue
concerning the definition of “family” of the 1960’s and 1970’s, or
the many difficult questions that lie on the horizon, posed by new
technologies of in vitro fertilization, surrogacy, prolongation of life
through technical means,32 or others unimagined now, the principle
of individual privacy, dignity, and autonomy for which Justice
Blackmun has stood will stand at the top of the list of civil rights
protected against governmental interference absent the most com-
pelling justifications.
27. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
28. See Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
29. See Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
30. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
31. Id. at 499.
32. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, 110 S.Ct.
2841 (1990) (dealing with the right of legal guardians to order termination of medi-
cal treatment for individual in persistent vegetative state), and opinion by Bren-
nan, J., joined by Justice Blackmun, id. at 2863, arguing for the right of the
individual and the guardian to decide this difficult issue.
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II. RACE
Almost equally high on the hierarchy of civil rights that Justice
Blackmun has protected stands the right to be free from race dis-
crimination, both in the conventional cases of actions that disadvan-
tage persons because of their race, and in the more difficult
circumstances of affirmative efforts designed to erase the enduring
effects of the legacy of discrimination.  From his earliest days on the
Court, he has displayed an unswerving commitment to the principle
and the promise of genuine equality for all.
October Term 1970 was the Justice’s first full term on the
Court, and it had more than its share of landmark civil rights cases.
Among others, the Court handed down its decisions in Griggs v.
Duke Power Company,33 which banned employment tests that had
a racially discriminatory effect, if they were not sufficiently job-re-
lated; Griffin v. Breckenridge,34 which breathed new life into 42
U.S.C. § 1985(3) by finding that it reached private conspiracies to
violate the civil rights of a defined class;35 and Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Board of Education,36 which broke new ground on
the remedies available for the desegregation of school districts. In
each of these, Justice Blackmun joined the majority’s opinions vin-
dicating the rights of the black plaintiffs.
It was not long before he authored some opinions for the
Court himself. In 1973, he wrote for the Court in Tillman v. Whea-
ton-Haven Recreation Association,37 holding that a private club’s ra-
cially discriminatory membership policy violated 42 U.S.C. § 1982.
The next year, he wrote for the Court in Gilmore v. City of Mont-
gomery, Alabama,38 striking down a city policy with respect to al-
legedly private swimming pools that had the effect of creating
segregated enclaves and depriving blacks of access to parks and rec-
reational facilities. In many subsequent cases, he either wrote or
joined opinions ensuring the vigorous and effective enforcement of
33. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
34. 403 U.S. 88 (1971).
35. Recently, a majority of the Court read Griffin narrowly, as it decided that
§ 1985(3) did not afford protection to women seeking abortions from the organ-
ized violent behavior of those seeking to prevent their access to clinics.  Bray v.
Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic, 113 S.Ct. 753 (1993).  Justice Blackmun joined
the dissenting opinions of both Justice Stevens, id. at 779, and Justice O’Connor,
id. at 799.
36. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
37. 410 U.S. 431 (1973).
38. 417 U.S. 556 (1974).
2017] JUSTICE BLACKMUN AND INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS 341
the constitutional and statutory prohibitions relating to race
discrimination.39
In many ways, however, the case that crystallized Justice
Blackmun’s position on the problem of race discrimination (and in-
cidentally removed all doubt in the mind of the press about his lib-
eral credentials) was Regents of the University of California v.
Bakke,40—the first genuine “affirmative action” case. Bakke in-
volved the constitutionality of a special admissions program
adopted by the Medical School of the University of California at
Davis, which was designed to assure the admission of a specified
number of minority students.  The Court splintered badly in its de-
cision, with two different groups of five agreeing to the two main
holdings: (1) that Bakke had to be admitted to the Medical School,
but that (2) it was wrong to prohibit the school from taking race
into account in its admissions process.  Justice Blackmun, with Jus-
tices White, Marshall, and Brennan, agreed with the second point
and would have reversed the first point and held that the school was
within its rights to deny admission to Bakke.  The Justice joined
Justice Brennan’s opinion for those four, but it is his own briefer
separate opinion that commands our attention here.
Citing the tiny percentage of minority doctors in the country,
he wrote, “[i]f ways are not found to remedy that situation, the
country can never achieve its professed goal of a society that is not
race conscious.”41  This followed from the original purpose of the
Fourteenth Amendment and its goal of complete equality. He
frankly recognized the tensions affirmative action creates, but he
wrote:
39. See, e.g., Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 409 U.S. 205
(1972) (permitting action claiming racial discrimination in housing policies); Mc-
Donnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (permitting individual dis-
crimination claim); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974)
(permitting Title VII action after private arbitration); Albemarle Paper Co. v.
Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975) (concurring in the judgment that back pay should
normally accompany a finding of unlawful discrimination, but stating that the em-
ployer’s good faith ought to be a “very relevant factor” in fashioning an affirmative
remedial order); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976) (dissenting from Court deci-
sion striking down a lower court order designed to remedy police mistreatment of
minority citizens); Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976) (holding that 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981 prohibited private, commercial, nonsectarian schools from denying admis-
sion to prospective students solely on the basis that they were black); Gladstone
Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91 (1979) (upholding housing discrimina-
tion complaint relating to the practice of racial steering).
40. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
41. Id. at 403.
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I suspect that it would be impossible to arrange an affirmative
action program in a racially neutral way and have it successful.
To ask that this be so is to demand the impossible. In order to get
beyond racism, we must first take account of race. There is no
other way. And in order to treat some persons equally, we must
treat them differently. We cannot—we dare not—let the Equal
Protection Clause perpetuate racial supremacy.42
Justice Blackmun took a similar approach to the question
raised in United Steelworkers v. Weber,43 whether Title VII prohib-
its all private, voluntary, race-conscious affirmative action plans.
Voting with the majority to uphold the plan, and thus to reject
Weber’s Title VII attack on it, he wrote separately of his misgivings
and of the “practical and equitable” considerations supporting the
Court’s result.  Given the broad remedial purpose of Title VII, it
should not be construed to foreclose private affirmative efforts to
redress the effects of segregation.  In addition, noting as always the
particular facts, the Justice cited the moderate, temporary nature of
the program, and the ability of Congress to correct any mistakes in
statutory interpretation.44
Justice Blackmun has consistently supported the same kinds of
measured, voluntary affirmative action programs in other contexts,
sometimes with majorities, sometimes in dissent. The cases include
Fullilove v. Klutznick,45 Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v.
Stotts,46 Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education,47 Local 28 v.
EEOC,48 Local 93 v. City of Cleveland,49 and United States v. Para-
42. Id. at 407.
43. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
44. Id. at 216.
45. 448 U.S. 448, 517 (1980) (joining opinion of Marshall, J., concurring in the
judgment that upheld the constitutionality of the 10% minority set-aside provision
of the Public Works Employment Act of 1977).
46. 467 U.S. 561, 593 (1984) (dissenting from a Court opinion that struck
down an injunction to effectuate the terms of an earlier consent decree designed to
redress racial discrimination).
47. 476 U.S. 267, 295 (1986) (joining Justice Marshall’s dissent from Court
holding that a school board’s policy of extending preferential protection against
layoffs to minority teachers violated the 14th Amendment).
48. 478 U.S. 421 (1986) (joining Justice Brennan’s opinion for the majority in
holding that the district court properly used statistical evidence in evaluating a
union’s membership policies, and that certain measures were properly taken to
supervise the court’s orders, and joining Justice Brennan’s opinion for the plurality
in holding that Title VII does not prohibit a court from ordering affirmative, race-
conscious relief as a remedy for past discrimination).
49. 478 U.S. 501 (1986) (joining Justice Brennan’s opinion for the Court hold-
ing that Title VII did not preclude the entry of a consent decree that might benefit
individuals who were not actual victims of the employer’s discriminatory practices,
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dise.50 The general point that emerges from the record is clear:
through good times and bad, in the majority, the plurality, and in
dissent, Justice Blackmun has done his utmost to enforce the consti-
tutional and statutory commands against race discrimination, and
for a truly equal society.
III. SEX DISCRIMINATION
Although there can be no doubt about the Justice’s commit-
ment to the principle of legal equality between the sexes, given
among other things his positions in the abortion cases, this is an
area where he has acknowledged a greater role for governmental
response to actual differences.  Perhaps he has been ahead of his
time:  it is interesting to note that feminist scholarship has moved in
a similar direction.51  In the late 1960’s and early to mid-1970’s, its
emphasis was on formal equality, but as time has gone on, feminist
theory has moved beyond this to a more complex undertaking to
identify the special needs of women without at the same time re-
turning to the protective or repressive stereotypes of earlier eras.52
Shortly after Justice Blackmun joined the Court, then-Chief
Justice Berger wrote for a unanimous Court in Reed v. Reed,53 strik-
ing down an Idaho statute that mandated a preference for males as
potential estate administrators.  Rather than subjecting that state
law to the lenient “rational basis” standard normally used to assess
economic legislation, Reed demanded a “fair and substantial rela-
tionship” between the statutory goal and the means used to achieve
it (here, of course, the gender-based classification).  It found the
preference for males to be wanting.
In 1975, the same kind of issue returned to the Court in Stan-
ton v. Stanton,54 which involved a Utah law specifying eighteen as
the age of majority for females, and 21 for males.  This time Justice
and that voluntary actions to eradicate race discrimination might include reasona-
ble race-conscious measures).
50. 480 U.S. 149 (1987) (joining Justice Brennan’s plurality opinion conclud-
ing that even under a strict scrutiny analysis, the one-black-for-one-white promo-
tion requirement imposed by the District Court for the Alabama Department of
Public Safety was permissible under the Equal Protection Clause).
51. For an excellent collection of articles that document these changes, see
Symposium, Feminism in the Law: Theory, Practice and Criticism, 1989 Univ. of
Chicago Legal Forum, and the opening article, Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Barbara
Flagg, Some Reflections on the Feminist Legal Thought of the 1970s, id. at 9.
52. See, e.g., Mary E. Becker, Prince Charming: Abstract Equality, 1987 SUP.
COURT REV. 201.
53. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
54. 421 U.S. 7 (1975). See also Stanton v. Stanton, 429 U.S. 501 (1977) (reiter-
ating the holding of Stanton I).
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Blackmun wrote for the Court.  Notably, he found it unnecessary to
decide whether a classification based on sex is inherently suspect:
precisely the position he had taken in Frontiero v. Richardson,55 in
which he refused to join an opinion by Justice Brennan so classify-
ing gender, and instead joined Justice Powell’s opinion concurring
in the judgment.  Instead, in Stanton, the Justice found Reed to be
controlling.  Acknowledging that Utah might have relied on facts
such as the earlier biological maturity of girls, he nonetheless con-
demned the classification for its irrational reliance on old stereo-
types, and for its failure to recognize that “[n]o longer is the female
destined solely for the home and the rearing of the family, and only
the male for the marketplace and the world of ideas.”56  Thus,
avoiding the strait-jacket of the “suspect classification,” Justice
Blackmun nonetheless imposed a high standard of justification on
legislative distinctions based on sex.
The Court’s opinion in Craig v. Boren57 carried on with the
Reed/Stanton analysis, as it invalidated an Oklahoma law prohibit-
ing the sale of 3.2% beer to males under the age of twenty-one and
females under the age of eighteen.  Again demonstrating caution,
the Justice joined the opinion except insofar as it held that the oper-
ation of the Twenty-first Amendment did not alter the operation of
the equal protection clause; he did agree, however, that the Twenty-
first Amendment did not save the Oklahoma statute in question.58
In the same Term, he voted with the majority in Dothard v. Rawlin-
son to uphold an Alabama regulation establishing gender criteria
for prison guards in “contact” positions in maximum-security pris-
ons, on the ground that sex was a bona fide occupational qualifica-
tion (BFOQ) under Title VII for these positions.59
The Justice’s unwillingness to disregard objective differences
between men and women is easily observable in his positions in the
various insurance cases the Court has heard, including General
Electric v. Gilbert,60 City of Los Angeles, Department of Water and
Power v. Manhart,61 and Arizona Governing Committee v. Norris.62
55. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
56. 421 U.S. at 14-15.
57. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
58. Id. at 204-210 (Part II.D), 214 (opinion of Blackmun, J., concurring in
part). The opinion of the Court also disapproved the earlier decision in Goesaert v.
Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948), both on equal protection and Twenty-first Amend-
ment grounds. Justice Blackmun’s reservation may also have covered this
statement.
59. 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
60. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
61. 435 U.S. 702 (1978).
62. 463 U.S. 1073 (1983).
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In Gilbert, he joined the Court’s opinion holding that the exclusion
of disability due to pregnancy from a benefits plan did not violate
Title VII in itself, while carefully leaving open the possibility of an
effects-based theory.63 Gilbert was later legislatively overruled by
the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978.64  In Manhart, however,
he joined a Court judgment finding a requirement of greater pen-
sion contributions for women to be in violation of Title VII.  With
typical scrupulousness, he pointed out the tension between the
Manhart holding and the General Electric holding in his separate
opinion. He concluded that he could accept a restriction on the
scope of the earlier decision, given that the only issue was one of
statutory construction.  Later, in Norris, it was Justice Blackmun’s
turn to read precedents narrowly, as he would have confined
Manhart to its facts and would have upheld differences in retire-
ment benefits according to sex-based actuarial tables.65
In a group of cases including Orr v. Orr,66 Michael M. v. Supe-
rior Court,67 and Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan,68 Jus-
tice Blackmun has supported legislation or positions designed to
assist women. In Orr, which held that alimony obligations could not
vary according to sex, he reiterated his support in a concurring
opinion for the holding of Kahn v. Shevin,69 in which the Court had
upheld more generous payments for widows than for widowers. In
Michael M, he concurred in the judgment of the majority that the
California statutory rape law should be upheld over an equal pro-
tection challenge, while offering the following pointed comment:
It is gratifying that the plurality recognizes that “[a]t the risk of
stating the obvious, teenage pregnancies . . . have increased dra-
matically over the last two decades” and “have significant social,
63. See supra note 61.  The key holding of the Court, which was that a distinc-
tion based upon pregnancy was not a “sex-based” distinction, caused an outburst
of laughter in the courtroom the day that the Gilbert decision was announced,
suggesting perhaps that this was an area where a dose of common sense would
have helped the judicial process.
64. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k).  The PDA specifies that sex discrimination includes
discrimination on the basis of pregnancy.  In 1987, Justice Blackmun joined the
opinions by Justice Marshall for the Court in part and for a plurality in part, hold-
ing that the Pregnancy Discrimination Act did not pre-empt state legislation ex-
tending special benefits to pregnant workers (namely, the right to a pregnancy
leave with reinstatement to the same or a comparable job afterwards).  California
Federal Sav. and Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987).
65. 463 U.S. at 1095 (joining opinion of Powell, J., dissenting in part and con-
curring in part).
66. 440 U.S. 268 (1979).
67. 450 U.S. 464 (1981).
68. 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
69. 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
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medical and economic consequences for both the mother and her
child, and the State.” There have been times when I have won-
dered whether the Court was capable of this perception, particu-
larly when it has struggled with the different but not unrelated
problems that attend abortion issues.70
The absolute prohibition of sexual intercourse with underage
women was a constitutionally acceptable way for the state to ad-
dress these issues.
In Hogan, the Justice displayed a similar willingness to allow
state regulation, when he dissented from the Court’s condemnation
of a state-supported single sex (all-female) school of nursing,
writing:
I have come to suspect that it is easy to go too far with rigid rules
in this area of claimed sex discrimination, and to lose—indeed
destroy—values that mean much to some people by forbidding
the State to offer them a choice while not depriving others of an
alternative choice.71
The Equal Protection Clause does not, he continued, require
“needless conformity.”
Nonetheless, thanks again to his careful attention to both facts
and legal doctrine, and to his underlying respect for individual au-
tonomy, Justice Blackmun had no trouble understanding and thus
invalidating the so-called fetal vulnerability policy of the Johnson
Controls Company.  In International Union, UAW v. Johnson Con-
trols,72 he authored the Court’s opinion rejecting a company policy
to exclude all fertile female employees from certain jobs due to the
risk to fetal development of exposure to dangerous substances
(there, principally lead).  Neither the business necessity justification
nor the BFOQ exception to Title VII could save this kind of sex-
based employment criterion. With full disclosure of the risks,
women could judge for themselves whether or not to accept such
jobs.
IV. OTHER AREAS
So many other cases have also raised questions about individ-
ual rights that it is difficult to draw the line for this article.  The
Justice has decided cases involving the rights of aliens, whom he has
protected with the same vigor as he has other racial and ethnic
70. 450 U.S. at 481-82.
71. 458 U.S. at 734.
72. 111 S.Ct. 1196 (1991).
2017] JUSTICE BLACKMUN AND INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS 347
groups;73 the rights of illegitimate children and their parents, where
he has recognized a variety of possible legitimate state interests;74
the rights of the disabled, where he has generally deferred to statu-
tory levels of protection;75 and age discrimination, where he again
has relied heavily on statutory guidance.76 In all these, as in the
three areas examined here in detail, several general themes emerge.
73. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413
U.S. 634 (1973); Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 571 (1974) (Blackmun, J., concurring
in the judgment); Examining Board of Engineers, Architects and Surveyors v. de
Otero, 426 U.S. 572 (1976); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 231 (1982) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring). See also Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, 481 U.S. 615 (1987)
(Jews may state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1982); St. Francis College v. Al-Khazraji,
481 U.S. 604 (1987) (person of Arabian ancestry may be protected under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981).
74. See Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971) (Justice Blackmun with the
majority opinion upholding a Louisiana law barring illegitimate children from
sharing equally in an intestate father’s estate with the legitimate children); Stanley
v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 659 (1972) (Justice Blackmun joining Chief Justice Bur-
ger’s dissent to the Court opinion holding that a state statute denying an unwed
father a hearing on his parental qualifications violated the Equal Protection Clause
and the Due Process Clause); Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976) (upholding
provisions of the Social Security Act that condition the eligibility of certain illegiti-
mate children for surviving child’s insurance benefits upon special showing); Lalli
v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 276 (1978) (concurring in the judgment on the ground that
Labine should be followed). On the other side, see Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S.
347, 361 (1979) (objecting to a ruling upholding a Georgia statute under which the
father of a deceased illegitimate child was required to pursue statutory legitimiza-
tion proceedings as a condition of suing for wrongful death, but not a mother);
Califano v. Boles, 443 U.S. 282, 297 (1979) (joining dissenting opinion in case up-
holding federal regulations denying mother’s insurance benefits to the mother of
an illegitimate child who never married the wage earner).
75. See, e.g., Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985) (rejecting claim under
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 that a state Medicaid rule change would have an unlaw-
ful disproportionate impact on the disabled); Bowen v. American Hospital Ass’n,
476 U.S. 610 (1986) (joining plurality opinion that held, inter alia, that a hospital’s
withholding of treatment from a handicapped infant when consent for treatment
had not been given by the parents did not violate the Rehabilitation Act); School
Board of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987) (joining opinion finding
that tuberculosis and similar contagious diseases could be a handicap within the
meaning of the Rehabilitation Act); Traynor v. Turnage, 485 U.S. 535, 552 (1988)
(opinion concurring in part, dissenting in part, and objecting to the majority’s “ir-
rebuttable presumption” about the willfulness of primary alcoholism, because the
Rehabilitation Act was designed to eliminate such presumptions).  Note, however,
that in City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 455
(1985), Justice Blackmun joined Justice Marshall’s opinion concurring in part and
dissenting in part, which applied a higher level of scrutiny to a municipal zoning
ordinance that disadvantaged the mentally retarded.
76. See Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93 (1979) (Congress did not violate Equal
Protection Clause by requiring retirement at age 60 of Foreign Service officers);
Western Air Lines v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400 (1985) (statutory violation of the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act to require flight engineers and pilots to retire
at 60 without strong justification); TWA v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111 (1985) (transfer
policy based on age of pilot violated ADEA; no BFOQ shown). In Oscar Mayer &
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First, when the core values of privacy and family arise, Justice
Blackmun holds legislation up to the most exacting scrutiny.
Second, when the characteristic in question is “immutable,” in
the Carolene Products sense, Justice Blackmun demands a compel-
ling state interest before it can be upheld against constitutional
challenge.
Third, when common sense tells him that the distinction at is-
sue may be genuine—for example, only women get pregnant; actu-
arial studies consistently reveal differences between general male
and female experience; minors often require special treatment—he
is willing to listen carefully to the justification offered to support it.
Even so, he will reject classifications based on generalized assump-
tions, simple convenience, or the like.
Fourth, throughout the area of individual rights, the Justice has
paid close attention to the source of the right in question. Positions
he is willing to take in statutory cases may not be identical to his
constitutional interpretations.  As the type of right asserted moves
farther from the privacy and autonomy interests of the individual
and the right not to be disadvantaged because of immutable charac-
teristics, he recognizes greater and greater freedom for the legisla-
ture to choose the required degree of protection.
V. CONCLUSION
Coming from the State of Minnesota, with its traditions that
combine a strong sense of individualism with an equally strong
sense of social responsibility, Justice Blackmun has been one of the
leading voices for individual rights on the Supreme Court for the
last twenty-three years.  He has respected democratic institutions
without ever forgetting that the Court stands as the final guardian
of human rights for each person in our society.  It is a record of
which we all can be proud—a record in which we all have shared,
and will continue to share in the future.
Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 765 (1979), Justice Blackmun specifically referred to
the remedial nature of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, and the need
to construe it liberally.
